Columbia should not have adopted the IHRA definition of antisemitism - Incite at Columbia University

In a message to Columbia University community, dated July 15^th, Acting President Shipman announced “additional commitments to combatting antisemitism.”

Among these, she informed the university community that from now on the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance’s (IHRA) definition of antisemitism will be incorporated into the university’s anti-discrimination policies, specifically to inform how the Office of Institutional Equity (OIE) makes decisions about what constitutes “evidence of discriminatory intent.”  This policy is wrong. It is anti-intellectual and tendentious, essentially shutting down debate and dialogue in the very place where it should be conducted.

Consider some of the examples given by the IHRA definition for what would constitute evidence of antisemitism: “claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor…Applying double standards by requiring of it [e.g. Israel] a behavior not expected or demanded of any other democratic nation…Drawing comparisons of contemporary Israeli policy to that of the Nazis.” By this standard, a scholar conducting comparative research of genocide (which by design compared cases which both could or could not be reasonably thought to constitute genocide), who includes the present Israeli campaign in Gaza—which has killed an estimated 58,000 people, nearly a third of them children, and destroyed about 70% of the built structures in the area – would be considered antisemitic.

In a strange irony, on the very same day that President Shipman announced that Columbia is adopting the IHRA definition, the New York Times ran an op-ed essay by Omer Bartov, Professor of History at Brown and a well-known Holocaust scholar, titled “I am a genocide scholar. I know it when I see it.” Bartov, who was born in Israel, served in its army as an officer, and has written extensively about the extermination of the Jews by the Nazis, has reached the “painful conclusion,” he says, that “Israel is committing genocide against the Palestinian people.” Bartov’s op-ed, based on what would be a “prohibited comparison” would constitute evidence of discriminatory intent.

We do not necessarily agree with Bartov, nor does it matter what our views are. It is possible that the word—“genocide”—has outlived its usefulness if the debate about it will come to eclipse the deeds themselves. But the policy announced by President Shipman would seem to prohibit even having this debate, and this at a moment in world history when this debate is imperative, and at the very halls where it stands the most chance to be productive. What else do scholars and scientists do but compare? How else do we advance the conversation, achieve analytical clarity, reach some agreement about standards to be applied, if not by comparing? How would we know if Israel’s actions constitute genocide or not if we do not compare them to actions by other nations, including the most heinous?

And as to “double standards,” they are in the eye of the beholder and a form of whataboutism. A Jew who wanted to hold his or her own nation, religion, and state to a higher moral standard would be labeled thereby antisemitic? Are Christians who want to hold themselves and fellow congregants to a higher moral standard be anti-Christian?

Finally, using the IHRA definition to determine “evidence of discriminatory intent” is anti-intellectual because it will shut down the free exchange of ideas that is the lifeblood of this university and that attracts students to it. Over the last year, Incite and the Trust Collaboratory, which we lead, have organized over 150 “Listening Tables” sessions, in which upwards of 1800 students participated. We were poised to expand the program next year, before we learned about President Shipman’s decision. The premise of the Listening Tables is to serve as a space of dialogue, where participants listen to one another genuinely and respectfully, even if they profoundly disagree. The tables are spaces where things are said that may be difficult to hear but can then be discussed and weighed by participants who are willing to put themselves in the other person’s shoes. Who would want to participate in these conversations now, when the sword of “evidence of discriminatory intent” hangs over their heads?

The definition of antisemitism proffered by the IHRA is unacceptable to the spirit of the University. Our own taskforce on antisemitism composed of our own faculty understood this last year when it refrained from defining antisemitism. How will criticism of this definition be interpreted and adjudicated now? Is this opinion piece, written by two Jews who are members of Columbia community evidence of discriminatory intent? We do not think so.

Peter Bearman
Jonathan R. Cole Professor of Sociology
Director, Incite Institute

Gil Eyal
Professor of Sociology
Director of the Trust Collaboratory at Incite Institute